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How should addictive behavior be explained? In terms of neurobiological illness and compulsion, or as a choice 
made freely, even rationally, in the face of harmful social or psychological circumstances? Some of the 
disagreement between proponents of the prevailing medical models and choice models in the science of addiction 
centres on the notion of “loss of control” as a normative characterization of addiction. In this article I examine 
two of the standard interpretations of loss of control in addiction, one according to which addicts have lost free 
will, the other according to which their will is weak. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken and propose 
therefore an alternative based on a dual-process approach. This alternative neither rules out a capacity in addicts 
to rationally choose to engage in drug-oriented behavior, nor the possibility that addictive behavior can be 
compulsive and depend upon harmful changes in their brains caused by the regular use of drugs. 
 
1 Introduction 
Addiction is a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, addicts seem knowingly to expose 
themselves to harm, including emotional distress, legal and financial problems, health problems 
and so on. Many report feeling miserable and wanting to quit. They are commonly thought of 
as having lost control over their drug-taking behavior. On the other hand, many addicts seem 
to be susceptible to a wide range of ordinary incentives, including money, and counter-
incentives such as the risk of harm, suggesting that they do in fact exercise a substantial degree 
of control over this same behavior. These apparently conflicting observations are frequently 
used by adherents of what are held to be the two main opposing models of addiction. The 
“medical model” sees addictive behavior as compulsive and symptomatic of neurobiological 
illness. The “choice model” sees it as the manifestation of harmful social or psychological 
circumstances that have led addicts to freely and, in a certain sense, rationally choose to engage 
in this behavior.     
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What exactly is it that the proponents of these two models disagree about? Some of their 
disagreement concerns the correct normative characterization of addiction where the bone of 
contention is the notion of “loss of control.” Loss of control refers to a highly heterogeneous 
phenomenon for which a precise definition is difficult to give, the trouble being that the 
empirical evidence does not seem to favour one normative characterization more than any other. 
In this article I want to suggest a way of thinking about addiction that resolves the apparent 
paradox. If correct, there will be no need for any normative conflict between medical models 
and choice models of addiction.  
The structure of the article is as follows: in the following two sections I examine two 
alternative interpretations of addicts’ control problem. According to the first, they have lost free 
will; according to the other, their will is weak. Contrary to what many have claimed, I argue 
that addicts typically neither have lost free will nor display ordinary weakness of will. In the 
subsequent section I propose an alternative interpretation of addicts’ control problem that is 
based on a dual-process approach. According to this proposal, addicts’ lack of control stems 
from a certain sort of malfunctioning of their will.1 This sort of malfunctioning does not rule 
out the capacity in addicts to act freely and, in a certain sense, rationally choose to engage in 
drug-oriented behavior, nor does it rule out the possibility that this behavior can be compulsive 
and depend upon harmful changes in their brains caused by the regular use of drugs.  
  
2 Addiction and Freedom of the Will 
What does it mean to “lose control of one’s actions”? It certainly means not doing what one, in 
some way, “wants to do”, i.e., where what one wants to do expresses the content of one’s will. 
Saying of someone that she has “lost control of her actions” is, therefore, to say that she is 
acting against her own will. Very generally, the term “will” refers to a cognitive state that has 
some action as part of its content, as well as an executive capacity to bring the world into 
conformity with that content.2 It is common to distinguish, broadly, between two different 
senses in which persons may be said to “act against their own will.” They can do so in the sense 
that their will is too weak to sustain the performance of what they want to do. Such persons are 
                                                 
1 The sort of view I am proposing is, of course, not new. For different versions, see e.g., Redish, 
Jensen, and Johnson (2008), Holton and Berridge (2013), Schroeder and Arpaly (2013).  
2 There are different views of exactly what sort of capacity this involves. According to one 
common view, it can be characterized, roughly, as the capacity to choose and to act in the light 
of reasons (see e.g., Raz 1997). This will be the view I shall assume in what follows.     
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said to suffer from “weakness of the will.” But they can also act against their will in the sense 
of being compelled by external forces to do other than they want. Such persons are said to lack 
“freedom of the will.” In both cases, although the person fails to express their will in action, the 
normative implications are very different. In the former, the person is held to be blameworthy 
(or at least rationally criticizable), in the latter she is not. That is because it is only in the latter 
case that persons are held to have been prevented from translating the content of their will into 
action. Much of the philosophical discussion about addiction has consequently revolved around 
determining to which of these normative categories addicts’ control problems belong. That is, 
does their loss of control typify weakness of will or unfreedom of the will? My own view, which 
I shall argue for in a moment, is that it typifies neither – at least not as they are ordinarily 
understood. Let me start with the claim that addicts’ control problem consists in a loss of 
freedom of the will.   
 
2.1 Addiction as Loss of Free Will: Irresistible Desires and Rational Incapacity  
According to a plausible view, one (at least) necessary condition of a person having free will 
with respect to a particular action at a given time is that she has the capacity to refrain from that 
action at that time. If addicts’ control problem is lack of free will, it follows that addicts typically 
lack the capacity to refrain from drug-oriented behavior. Those who accept this claim tend to 
assume that what prevents addicts from exercising their will is that their addiction creates such 
an overwhelming desire for drugs as to be literally irresistible.3 To say that a person’s desire is 
“irresistible” is to say that she is unable to resist acting on it. This is commonly interpreted as 
meaning that she has lost a rational capacity – broadly construed, the capacity to respond to 
reasons of a certain type (Fisher and Ravizza 1998). Given the plausible view that capacities 
are general or multi-track in nature – they don’t simply manifest themselves as single 
possibilities, but rather as whole rafts of possibilities – a person can be said to have lost such a 
capacity if a whole host of relevantly similar counterfactuals are true of her (Smith 2003). 
Consider, for example, a cocaine addict. What makes it the case that she has lost the capacity 
to resist cocaine? According to the reasons-responsiveness view, it would be true to say of her 
that she would not respond to reasons to refrain from cocaine – cocaine of ever so slightly 
different kinds, in ever so slightly different circumstances – in a suitable context of relevantly 
similar possible worlds in which she was given what she took to be good and sufficient reasons 
                                                 
3 For a classic statement of this view, see Frankfurt (1971). 
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to refrain from cocaine. In short, addicts lack free will with respect to their drug-oriented 
choices and actions because they have lost the capacity to respond to reasons to abstain.  
Is there any evidence that addicts suffer from this sort of rational incapacity? No. On 
the contrary, there appears to be plenty of evidence that they do not. The evidence demonstrates 
that a wide range of counterfactuals of the sort just mentioned is actually false of many addicts. 
Several studies suggest, for example, that addictive behavior varies as a function of costs, 
benefits and cultural values, and many addicts appear to quit sucessfully unaided when they 
reach their early thirties (Heyman 2009; Pickard 2013). One particularly interesting illustration 
of addicts’ capacity to control their drug-oriented motivation is provided by a form of 
behavioral therapy known as contingency management (CM) treatment. In CM, every time a 
desired behavior occurs, tangible and immediate reinforcers are applied. When it does not 
occur, they are withdrawn (see Petry et al. 2011). When the method is applied to substance 
disorders, they commonly use an exchange system. Patients receive vouchers for metabolic 
evidence of drug abstinence. Every time an addict submits a scheduled urine sample (typically 
three times a week) that tests negative for drugs, she earns a voucher that can then be traded in 
for desirable but inexpensive goods, such as restaurant gift certificates, clothing, or electronics. 
The value of the vouchers increases with each consecutive instance of proven drug abstinence. 
Conversely, if the patient uses drugs or fails to submit a scheduled sample, the value of the 
voucher is reset to the starting point. In combination with counseling, CM has proved a 
surprisingly effective method (Heyman 2009). Several studies have shown that, compared with 
control groups receiving traditional psychological counseling, a significantly larger number of 
subjects in the voucher groups remain abstinent during and after CM treatment. 
Now, it is reasonable to infer that CM treatment must impact on addicts’ capacity for 
reasons-responsiveness, either by strengthening their motivation to exercise this capacity or by 
strengthening the capacity itself – or perhaps by some combination of the two. For present 
purposes, what is interesting about it is that it suggests that some capacity must be present also 
before treatment with CM. In fact, voluntarily submitting to CM treatment and complying with 
the therapist’s instructions seems evidence of such capacity. The effectiveness of CM, in other 
words, appears difficult to explain unless one assumes that many addicts do in fact possess a 
rational capacity, at least to some extent. If this capacity is diminished as a result of drug abuse, 
it would presumably explain why they find it difficult to abstain. But if many addicts typically 
possess rational capacity, it is not plausible that addiction typically causes a loss of free will 
with respect to drug-related choices and actions. The view that addicts necessarily lack free will 
is therefore likely to be false.  
5 
 
Should the control problem be conceptualized then in terms of ordinary weakness of 
will? Some have argued that it should (e.g., Benn 2007). In section 2.2 I present two different 
versions of this view (corresponding to two different accounts of weakness of will) and argue 
that both are mistaken.  
 
2.2 Addiction and Weakness of the Will 
The claim that addiction is a species of weakness of the will can be interpreted in two ways, 
corresponding to two different views of the nature of weakness of will. According to what, 
perhaps, has become the dominant view, weakness of will refers to the violation of a 
“resolution,” where the resolution is a kind of decision, intention, plan, or policy that is formed 
precisely in order to remain firm in the face of contrary desires one expects to arise when the 
time to act comes (Holton 1999). According to this view, weakness of will is manifested in an 
over-readiness to abandon one’s resolutions for exactly the type of reasons they were meant to 
overcome. If addicts typically are weak-willed in this sense, their control problem consists in a 
persistent lack of resolve with respect to abstinent behavior. So, for illustration, imagine an 
addict who now forms a resolution to abstain from taking drugs in the future. As the opportunity 
for consumption draws near, she succumbs to the temptation to rationalize her reluctance to 
abstain by changing her mind about what would be best, for example, by giving too much 
weight to certain considerations that appear to provide reasons for consumption, such as the 
immediate pleasures of the drug, and then revises her resolution to abstain accordingly, usually 
regretting it afterwards. This sort of weakness involves diachronic conflict, the irrationality of 
which is displayed in a form of incoherence between her motivational state at the time of action 
and her long-term attitudes toward these states. 
However, not all agree that weakness of will must involve violation of a resolution. The 
traditional view, dating back to Aristotle, is that weakness of will is the same as “akrasia,” i.e.,  
intentional action freely performed against the person’s consciously held judgement that, on the 
whole, it would be best not to perform the action (Mele 2009). According to this view, weakness 
of will is expressed in a failure to comply with one’s own best judgments while still holding 
them. It involves, in other words, a synchronic conflict, the irrationality of which is displayed 
in a form of incoherence in the person’s attitudes at the time of action. If addicts are weak-
willed in this sense, they typically might not be forming resolutions to give up their addictions. 
Rather, their control problem might consist, precisely, in their failure to form such resolutions. 
Typically, what they find hard might be to decide to do or commit themselves to doing what 
their own judgment is telling them would be the best option all things considered. There need 
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be no sense, therefore, of them constantly changing their minds about what is best. Rather, their 
problem is that they cannot make up their minds to actually do it. Their defect consists in a 
failure to comply with their best judgment. 
Before proceeding, let me add a brief remark about these two views, as there has been 
some controversy about which of them truly captures the nature of weakness of will (Holton 
1999; Mele 2009; May and Holton 2012). I shall assume, for present purposes, that there can 
be both akratic and non-akratic forms of weakness of will. I do so because it seems to me that 
insofar as we care about this phenomenon at all, we care about it because of its normative 
significance, because weak-willed people are held to be rationally criticizable (or blameworthy) 
for succumbing to temptation.4 Thus, it is widely agreed to be reasonable to expect or demand 
that persons displaying weakness of will resist acting on their contrary desires – something that 
is commonly taken to imply the possession (unlike persons lacking in free will) of capacities of 
resistance.5 In other words, weakness of will is displayed by persons insofar as they are 
criticizable (or blameworthy) for making insufficient effort to exercise capacities they are 
believed to possess in order to do what they in some sense want to do. If the importance of 
weakness of will – at least for most practical purposes – is associated with its normative 
characterization, I think it would be a reasonable hypothesis to assume that the ordinary notion 
of weak-willed action corresponds to a more general notion of action lacking in self-control due 
to insufficient effort rather than to any of the more technical definitions discussed in the 
philosophical literature.6 This means, of course, that weakness of will is displayed both by 
persons who exert insufficient effort to make up their mind about what to do, i.e. to make 
decisions, form resolutions or commitments, as well as by persons who exert insufficient effort 
to stick to such decisions, resolutions or commitments in the face of temptation. One might 
wonder, though, why it matters whether addicts typically display weakness of will in the akratic 
or non-akratic sense. There is, however, a practical reason why it might matter: helping addicts 
overcome a tendency to unreasonably revise their resolutions to give up drugs may seem to 
require a different kind of approach than helping them make such resolutions in the first place. 
                                                 
4 By “we” here I mean us ordinary folk. I take weakness of will to be, at its core, a folk-
psychological notion. There may still, of course, be other reasons why someone might care 
about it (e.g., philosophical or scientific reasons).  
5 For a different view, however, see Watson (2004). 
6 For empirical evidence that the folk notion of weakness of will may not be identical with any 
one of the two standard definitions in the philosophical literature, see May and Holton (2012).  
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While the former requires helping them learn ways of avoiding drug-associated thoughts, cues, 
or situations that might lead to a reconsideration of their resolutions, the latter seems more a 
matter of strengthening their motivation to actually do what they themselves judge is best, that 
is, to support and encourage them to translate their best judgments into practical plans or 
commitments to maintain abstinence. 
Now, deciding whether addiction typifies akratic or non-akratic weakness of will is 
obviously problematic because it is very difficult to assess whether addicts in general retain the 
judgment that it would have been better to abstain or, by the time they have embarked on their 
addictive behavior, whether they have revised it. Nevertheless, both alternatives seem to have 
some evidence in their favor. In sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 I shall present some of this evidence. 
However, I shall argue that even if addiction is frequently associated with both diachronic and 
synchronic forms of irrationality, it is still misleading to treat it as a case of ordinary weakness 
of will.   
 
2.2.1 Addiction as Non-Akratic Weakness of the Will: Hyperbolic Discounting 
The best evidence that addicts tend to be weak-willed in the (non-akratic) resolution-violating 
sense is that their discount rates tend not to remain constant over time. “Discount rate” is the 
rate at which they discount the utility of future rewards, such as, for example, the benefits of a 
drug-free life. There is plenty of research suggesting that addicts have a tendency to discount 
the utility of future rewards, not by a fixed proportion per period of time (exponentially) – 
which would have led to temporally stable preferences – but by a proportion that declines as 
the length of the delay increases (hyperbolically), leading to regular and systematic preference 
reversals (Ainslie 2001; Bickel and Marsch 2001). Consider an alcoholic who prefers before 
breakfast not to drink at tonight’s dinner party but still has a strong craving for alcohol. As the 
opportunity to drink draws closer in time and the prospect of drink begins to weigh more heavily 
with her, the rate at which she discounts abstinence rises rapidly relative to the rate at which 
she discounts consumption. When the opportunity to imbibe finally presents itself, her estimate 
of its utility outweighs her estimate of the utility of abstinence with the result that her preference 
reverses. It may seem plausible that such “hyperbolic discounting” leads to weakness of the 
will, that is, an unreasonable over-readiness to abandon one’s resolutions. This view depends 
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on the assumption that hyperbolic discounting causes addicts to change their judgement of what 
is best at the time of action, i.e. when the alcohol or drugs become available for consumption.7 
Now, although addicts find it extremely hard to remain abstinent over the longer term 
(many of them probably due to hyperbolic discounting), the view that loss of control in 
addiction should be conceptualized in terms of non-akratic weakness of will faces a difficulty: 
in many cases addictive behavior does not seem to involve judgment shifts at the time of action. 
Three key observations support this: first, addictive behavior sometimes displays a strongly 
habitual element – a fact that seems important for understanding relapses among users who 
have quit and are attempting to remain abstinent (Schroeder and Arpaly 2013). Such relapses 
seem frequently triggered by environmental cues and often appear to occur without much 
conscious awareness of the behavior undertaken. Explaining them in terms of a shift in 
considered judgments about what it would be best to do, therefore seems implausible. Second, 
addicts sometimes seem to retain a strong sense of the disvalue of their drug-oriented behavior 
even as they are carrying it out. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that they sometimes 
make conscious and strenuous efforts to resist, even indeed while seeking or taking drugs. As 
Robert West (2006) puts it, “when the restraint fails, there is often (but not always) no sense of 
the addict having changed his mind and deciding to engage in the behavior as a positive step; 
rather the sense is of a failure to exert control followed by regret and a feeling of having let 
oneself down” (p. 133). But this seems difficult to explain on the assumption that addicts 
typically abandon their judgement that abstaining is best while satisfying their addiction. Third, 
addicts may continue to seek and take drugs even when they derive no pleasure from their 
consumption, even in the absence of withdrawal – even, in fact, when they are convinced that 
taking drugs is a disastrous course of action for them (Robinson and Berridge 1993). Once 
again, addicts would seem on this observation to retain at times their judgment of abstinence as 
the most valuable alternative while carrying out their drug-oriented behavior. 
 
2.2.2 Addiction as Akratic Weakness of the Will: “Wanting” and “Liking” 
                                                 
7 Levy (2006; 2014) defends a version this view. It is worth noting that if motivating preferences 
are revealed in actual behavior and a gap may obtain between such preferences and a person’s 
evaluative ranking of her alternatives, preferences can reverse in the absence of judgment shifts. 
The view that hyperbolic discounting causes weakness of the will depends, therefore, on the 
assumption that motivating preferences always track considered judgments. For a different 
view, see, e.g., Lowenstein (1999).  
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The above observations may be taken as supporting the view that addicts’ control problem must 
be one of akratic rather than of non-akratic weakness of the will. Akratic weakness of will, 
remember, is action carried out contrary to the person’s consciously held judgment of what it 
would be best to do all things considered. An initial objection against this view could be that 
there simply is no evidence showing that it is even possible intentionally to perform actions 
while at the same time consciously judging that it would be best to refrain. All we can rely on 
to support this possibility are introspective reports of the persons themselves and such reports 
are notoriously unreliable (Levy 2011a). But there is other evidence. Of particular interest for 
our present purposes is the series of neuroscientific experiments conducted by Terry E. 
Robinson and Kent C. Berridge (see e.g., Robinson and Berridge 1998). Based on these 
experiments, they distinguish two components of motivation that are mediated by different 
psychological processes and neural substrates, what they call “liking,” which is associated with 
an affective or cognitive value, e.g., subjective pleasure, goodness or predicted utility; and 
“wanting,” which is associated with incentive salience – the degree to which a stimulus is 
action-driving. While “liking” and “wanting” normally go together so that we “want” the things 
we “like” (e.g. the value associated with some environmental cue serves as a trigger to activate 
and direct “wanting”), Robinson and Berridge provide evidence that they actually come apart 
in addiction, often making addicts “want” things they do not “like.” The possibility of a 
decoupling between “wanting” and “liking” supports the possibility of a dissociation between 
intentional action and best judgment; if “wanting” can make addicts perform actions contrary 
to what they “like,” and if judging some action as the best option entails “liking” it, then this is 
evidence that it is possible to perform actions contrary to one’s best judgment (see also Holton 
and Berridge 2013).  
So, granting that intentional action contrary to one’s best judgement is possible, should 
we, on the basis of the observations mentioned in the last section, conclude that addiction 
typically involves akratic rather than non-akratic weakness of will? I think there are reasons to 
resist that conclusion. But let me begin by addressing a worry some readers may have at this 
point. Why do we need to choose between the view of addiction as either a species of akratic 
or non-akratic weakness of will? Why can addicts not exhibit both forms of weakness of will? 
I think both questions are reasonable. Addicts are not all alike. They differ in circumstances, 
the drugs they use, their social and personal resources (e.g. abilities and motivation), and their 
beliefs about the value of their options. Moreover, as we have seen, there is credible evidence 
suggesting that they often violate their resolutions as well as that they sometimes act contrary 
to their best judgments. Addicts’ control problem often appears, then, to involve diachronic as 
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well as synchronic forms of irrationality. Still, I think there is an important sense in which 
addiction and ordinary weakness of the will differ. To see this we need to go back to what is 
arguably the commonsense notion of weakness of will according to which persons who try too 
little to exercise capacities they are assumed to possess in order to do what they in some sense 
want to do are criticizable (or blameworthy). Now, what determines an effort’s “insufficiency,” 
and thereby criticizability, is a normative matter. Presumably, there are certain shared 
expectations and norms guiding what counts as sufficient effort in various contexts. Thus, when 
we observe people failing to do what they want to do, we seem to have ways of correctly 
answering questions such as: did she try hard enough? I have elsewhere argued that the notion 
of sufficient effort is normative in the sense of being relative to the level of effort which, other 
things being equal, would have been sufficient for a normal person successfully to perform an 
action of the same type if she was as strongly motivated to perform it (Henden 2013). By 
“normal person” I mean someone whose capacity for self-control equals that of the majority of 
adults, and whose motivational system is congruent. In other words, if a person, according to 
this view, fails to do what she wants to do because her effort to do so is insufficient relative to 
this ordinary standard, she can be said to display weakness of will. In such cases, she is not, as 
we may say, sincerely trying. Hence she is criticizable (or blameweworthy) for her behavior.  
This gives us, I think, a way of distinguishing addiction from ordinary weakness of the 
will. The reason is that many addicts who try to abstain appear to try very hard to give up drugs, 
and many of them are wholly sincere in their effort to quit. Nevertheless, they fail again and 
again. If this failure cannot be explained by lack of capacity, it must be explained by insufficient 
effort. However, even though the effort they put into it is insufficient relative to what is actually 
required of them to abstain, it might still count as sufficient relative to ordinary standards. That 
is, if a normal person had made the same effort in similar circumstances, it would seem 
reasonable to expect her to succeed. Assuming, then, that many addicts display a strong will to 
give up drugs, it would seem unfair to criticize them for weakness of will. Rather, they seem 
instead to face some extraordinary obstacle peculiar to them that evades most normal persons. 
One observation supporting this is that we seem inclined to consider addicts much less 
criticizable (or blameworthy) for their drug-oriented behavior than weak-willed persons for 
their weak-willed behavior. Consider, for example, a cocaine addict and a weak-willed non-
addict both of whom take cocaine.8 Suppose both act contrary to their best judgements (or fail 
                                                 
8 On what grounds, it could be asked, can one distinguish a non-addicted user from an addicted 
one when their actual mental states and behavioral patterns are the same? The difference, I think 
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to keep to their resolutions). Their drug-oriented motivations, we will assume, were resistible 
at the time of action. Now, we are clearly more inclined to criticize the non-addict than the 
cocaine addict for their wrongful behavior. The reason seems obvious: while we assume it 
would be relatively easy for the non-addicted user to refrain from cocaine in this situation, it is, 
we assume, comparatively harder for the cocaine addict to do the same. This normative 
difference affects our attitudes towards the two cases, suggesting that our attitudes to addiction 
and ordinary weakness of will differ significantly. Admittedly, this observation alone is not 
conclusive evidence that addiction is not a species of weakness of will. Still, it gives us, I think, 
good reason to explore a different approach to the loss of control in addiction. It is to this 
approach I now turn. 
 
3 Addiction and Compulsion  
If we cannot conceive of addicts’ loss of control as loss of free will nor as ordinary weakness 
of will, how should we conceive of it? To answer this question, we might begin by noting that 
an important feature of addictive behavior is the regularity with which it occurs. The property 
of “being addicted” refers to a certain kind of relation a person has, not to some isolated act of 
consumption, but to a pattern of behavior, enacted on a regular basis in characteristic 
circumstances, which the person finds extremely difficult to override by intentional effort. 
Explaining an action in terms of addiction usually involves seeing it as part of such a behavioral 
pattern (in fact, it is not clear it even makes sense to speak of one-off addictive actions).  
Lack of control over behavioral patterns is, of course, also what tends to be emphasized 
in clinical descriptions of compulsive behavior. Such behavior is characterized as strongly cue-
dependent in the sense that it is regularly triggered by certain situations, places or people 
associated with the type of behavior in question; there is a feeling of being driven again and 
again to behave in precisely that particular way (often in spite of oneself), and it is a common 
                                                 
it is plausible to say, resides in certain counterfactuals being true when the person is an addicted 
and false when he is a non-addicted user. For example, it would be true of the addict but false 
of the non-addict that, as his supply of drugs wanes, he would begin obsessing over them, 
perhaps to the point of making an extraordinary effort to obtain them (often at great cost to 
himself). And were his drug use to become associated with displeasure, emotional distress, or 
health problems, it would be true of the addict but false of the non-addict that he would continue 
to consume the drug, often experiencing a physical compulsion to do so. See Skog (2003) for 
defense of a counterfactual definition of addiction. 
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experience that resistance, however sincere, becomes increasingly difficult over time. Since all 
these features are typically also present in addictive behavior, it seems reasonable to infer that 
addictive behavior is compulsive in the clinical sense. Indeed this is part of the standard medical 
definition of addiction (American Psychiatric Association 1994).9 If this is correct, it serves to 
further distinguish addiction from ordinary weakness of will since the latter is not definitionally 
tied to patterns of behavior exhibiting features of compulsivity. The question then becomes in 
what sense individuals who are exhibiting compulsive patterns of behavior are “acting against 
their own will.” 
 
3.1 Attention, Bias, and the Will 
One important aspect of the will concerns its relation to attention. That is because “executive 
control,” an umbrella term used in psychology for top-down cognitive processes that regulate, 
coordinate, and control other cognitive processes that are necessary for the initiation and 
monitoring of goal-directed actions (such as reasoning, planning or inhibition), involves 
directed attention, the capacity to voluntarily focus or shift attention. In fact, in some theories 
of executive control, they are not even clearly separated – executive control is treated as more 
or less identical to the mechanism controlling the deployment of attention (Miyake et al. 2000). 
Why this is relevant to our understanding of the loss of control in addiction is because there 
appears to be plenty of evidence that addicts’ attention is biased toward drug-associated stimuli 
(for a review, see e.g. Field and Cox 2008). An attentional bias is a certain sort of disruption of 
a person’s attentional selection process. This process is “biased” toward a particular kind of 
stimuli if the stimuli intrudes on her experience by capturing her attention and this capturing is 
part of a pattern and occurs in a systematic rather than random fashion. Attentional bias is, in 
other words, a statistical tendency or inclination to direct attention at a particular kind of stimuli 
(McKay & Efferson 2010). 
Now, evidence for drug-related attentional bias in addiction is provided by a variety of 
experiments measuring implicit cognition. In the addiction Stroop task, for example, addicts 
are asked to name the color of drug-related words, and the time they take to name the colour of 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting that while, in the philosophical literature, the term “compulsive behavior” 
tends to be used to characterize behavior caused by “irresistible desires,” there is no assumption 
in the clinical literature that behavior must be caused by “irresistible desires” in order to count 
as compulsive. When I speak of “compulsion” in what follows, it is the clinical notion I shall 
have in mind. For a discussion, see Henden, Melberg and Røgeberg (2013).  
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these words is compared to those for drug-unrelated words (e.g., words related to musical 
instruments). The challenge is to focus attention on color while blocking out the words’ 
meaning. Attentional bias is indexed as the difference between participants’ mean color-naming 
reaction time in trials with drug-related and those with drug-unrelated words (Cox et al. 2006). 
Using this approach, researchers have found that while addicts exhibit significantly slower 
reaction times and are more prone to error when naming the color of drug-related words, control 
participants do not exhibit this pattern. The result has been demonstrated in users of a variety 
of different drugs, including alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, and tobacco. The standard 
interpretation of this “Stroop interference” is that, compared to non-addicts, drug-related words 
capture addicts’ attention, causing excessive processing of the semantic content of these words, 
thereby disrupting their color naming.  
Based on the addiction Stroop and other paradigms developed to measure attentional 
bias, many researchers believe attentional bias toward drug-associated stimuli plays an 
important part in explaining the maintenance or escalation of drug-oriented behavior, including 
relapses among users who have quit and are attempting to remain abstinent.10 Robinson and 
Berridge’s influential theory, briefly discussed in section 2.2.2. explains why repeated drug use 
may lead to drug-related attentional bias. According to this theory, it is caused by a process 
they call “incentive-sensitization” in which repeated drug use produces a dopaminergic 
response that becomes sensitized (i.e. progressively larger) by making certain regions in the 
brain involved in the motivation of behavior more easily activated by drugs or drug-associated 
stimuli. As a consequence, these drug-associated stimuli acquire powerful “incentive 
properties” by drastically enhancing their capacity to grab the person’s attention and be 
                                                 
10 One caveat is in order: there has been some debate in the psychological literature concerning 
the interpretation of the evidence from the addiction Stroop, and not all agree that it 
demonstrates a bias in addicts’ attentional selection processes. Some have suggested, for 
example, that the delayed color naming could result from attempts to suppress the processing 
of drug-related words, or from a generic slowdown in cognitive processing as a consequence 
of experienced craving induced by the drug-related words rather than from a selective attention 
to those words (see e.g., Algom et al. 2004). The standard interpretation does, however, appear 
to be corroborated even when more direct measures of attentional bias are used, such as the 
monitoring of eye movements while the subject completes a visual probe task in which drug-
related and control pictures are presented. For discussion, see Field and Cox (2008).  
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perceived as particularly salient. According to Robinson and Berridge, it is this process of 
incentive-sensitization that causes a decoupling of “wanting” (incentive salience) from “liking.” 
In human addicts, drug-related attentional bias caused by incentive-sensitization 
presumably works through the human decision-making system, as evidenced in the ability of 
addicts, in general, to delay, alter and in some cases, substitute, their drug-oriented behavior 
based on deliberation. Typically, addicts plan when and how to obtain the drugs, taking all sorts 
of considerations into account. In order fully to explain how drug-related attentional bias 
produces drug-oriented behavior in humans, therefore, we need to know how the attentional 
bias interacts with the addicts’ decision-making system.11 In section 3.1.1, I present in broad 
outline what I think might be a plausible view of this interaction. 
 
3.1.1  Addiction as a Malfunctioning of the Will: A Dual-Process Perspective 
It has become common in cognitive psychology to distinguish between two modes of decision-
making; one fast, intuitive and effortless that is shaped by biology and implicit learning, the 
other slow, analytical and effortful, and shaped by culture and formal tuition.12 While the former 
mode – often referred to as type-1 processes – depends on environmental cues, is associative, 
automatic, and can control behavior directly without the need for controlled attention, the latter 
– often referred to as type-2 processes – depends on de-contextualization, is rule-based, and 
requires controlled attention and effort.13 To achieve rational decision-making and reliably 
contribute to the person’s goal achievement, the two modes have to work well together. This 
requires, first, that the person’s type-2 processes can exert an executive function and override 
the impulsive output of her type-1 processes. For this to happen, her type-2 process must be 
able to generate a more considered response that is in line with her normative reasons, as well 
as involve inhibitory mechanisms to suppress the response tendencies of her type-1 processes. 
                                                 
11 Incentive sensitization theory does not deny a role for top-down cognitive control. Robinson 
and Berridge are clear that whether or not a sensitized response is actually expressed may 
depend on contextual factors. See e.g., Robinson, Robinson and Berridge (2013).   
12 Parts of what follows are based on Henden, Melberg and Røgeberg (2013). A wide variety of 
evidence has converged on the conclusion that some sort of dual-process notion is needede to 
explain how the overall process of decision-making works. For a brief review, see Frankish and 
Evans (2009).   
13 There is some disagreement on precisely how these processes should be characterized and 
distinguished. I cannot enter into this debate here. For discussion, see Stanovich (2009).  
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Second, the person’s type-1 processes must be able to select adequate and relevant information 
about the practical situation as an input to her type-2 processes (Saunders and Over 2009). 
The sort of top-down processes that are associated with executive control exemplify 
type-2 processes. They are inferentially integrated with the person’s propositional attitude 
system and draw on all her background knowledge and beliefs. In contrast, the processes 
underpinning attentional bias are examples of type-1 processes. They consist of associative 
relations in memory between environmental cues and behavioral propensities – relations that 
can be activated during critical decision points without the person’s conscious intention, 
deliberation, or even awareness. The latter processes are modular in the sense of involving 
highly specified mechanisms that are inferentially isolated from the person’s propositional 
attitude system. 
Now, assuming this dual-process model of decision-making, drug-related attentional 
biases in type-1 processes might be hypothesized to affect addicts’ behavior in a variety of ways 
depending, most likely, on individual differences between addicts (e.g. differences in personal 
and social resources, abilities and motivation, type of drug used and so on). For example, one 
way might be by entering their type-2 processes and shaping their beliefs, desires, and reasoning 
about what to do. Thus, by persistently directing the person’s attention to drug-associated 
features of their immediate physical and social environment, the processes might cause an over-
appreciation of these features as well as blindness or indifference to longer-range goals (Dill 
and Holton 2014). The result could be that the rate at which these addicts discount the utility of 
future rewards, such as the benefits of abstinence, is increased drastically relative to the rate at 
which they discount consumption, leading to regular and systematic preference reversals (and 
perhaps judgement shifts) of the sort associated with hyperbolic discounting. 
However, drug-associated attentional bias might also shape addicts’ beliefs, desires, and 
reasoning without causing hyperbolic discounting. Not all addicts have unstable preferences. 
Some never make any effort to abstain from drugs because they have no desire to quit. Does 
that mean they are in full control of their drug-oriented behavior? I think most people would be 
inclined to say no. There is something odd about the idea of a person addicted to a drug being 
in “full control” of her behavior with respect to that drug. Simple reflection on the meaning of 
the notion of “being addicted” seems to speak against this possibility. Plausibly, addicts with 
stable preferences (who do not fight their addiction) will still show symptoms of compulsivity 
and obsession with respect to drug-seeking and drug-taking (e.g. drug-oriented considerations 
will always have precedence in their practical reasoning), or would show such symptoms if their 
drugs were to become unavailable or associated with an increase in negative costs (see footnote 
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8). Compulsivity and obsession – despite their superficial appearance of “too much control” – 
seem on a deeper level to indicate the opposite of control. The dual-process approach can 
explain in what sense control is lacking: even if some addicts have stable preferences, all their 
beliefs and desires will still be infused by drug-associated attentional bias; hence, by taking 
these beliefs and desires as inputs, their practical reasoning itself will in a sense be “out of 
control.” 
But drug-related attentional bias in a type-1 process might also affect an addict’s 
behavior in a much more direct way. As we have seen, there is evidence that addicts sometimes 
retain their judgment that abstinence is the most valuable alternative even as they are carrying 
out their drug-oriented behavior. From a dual-process perspective, the problem in these kinds 
of cases is not that the type-2 processes are internally biased, but rather that they regularly fail 
to suppress responses generated by their biased type-1 processes despite their conflicting with 
considered normative responses generated by their type-2 processes. The Stroop effect serves 
as a good example of such a dual-process conflict: an automatic type-1 process directs the 
subject’s attention to one feature of the stimulus (word meaning), which disrupts a type-2 
process (deciding the color of the word). Berridge and Robinson’s decoupling of “wanting” and 
“liking” is another example. As they describe “wantings” they are clearly modular. Not only 
are the processes that underpin them associative – and presumably operating at high speed and 
requiring low effort – they are implicit in the sense of being able to drive addicts’ behavior 
independently of their propositional attitude system (although in some cases they might operate 
by increasing their experienced cravings). It is reasonable to infer that “wantings” must be a 
kind of type-1 process. “Likings,” by contrast, seem underpinned by processes that work 
through addicts’ propositional attitude system. That is because they typically manifest 
themselves in cognitive-affective states such as desires, beliefs, and value judgments. Addicts 
who “want” to engage in drug-seeking and drug-taking without “liking” it can therefore 
plausibly be viewed as experiencing a dual-process conflict between a type-1 and a type-2 
process. 
Now the question was how drug-related attentional bias in a type-1 process might affect 
addicts’ behavior more directly. The answer, presumably, is that it upsets their will in some 
way. According to a theory that has gained wide acceptance in psychology, executive control 
functions all draw on the same limited resource. The more this resource is consumed, the more 
depleted it becomes and the poorer the person performs on subsequent tasks requiring executive 
control. This so-called “limited-resource model” of executive control is supported by numerous 
experiments showing that when people engage in executive control, later attempts at executive 
17 
 
control will be less successful (for a review, see Muraven and Baumeister 2000). Now the 
Stroop task is commonly used as a measure of executive control and cognitive depletion. The 
faster the participants name the colors of the words (which requires suppressing the initial 
tendency to name the meaning of these words), the higher their level of current executive 
control; the slower they are, the more depleted they are assumed to be. Since addicts perform 
poorly on the addiction Stroop compared to non-addicts, it is reasonable to infer that their 
executive functions are impaired by cognitive depletion. Plausibly, a drug-oriented type-1 
process directing attention toward drug-associated features of the environment has become 
fixed – most likely due to incentive-sensitization – in entrenched dispositions and patterns of 
perception and response, thereby increasing the cognitive load on executive functions 
associated with type-2 processes requiring directed attention. A dramatic increase of cognitive 
load on directed attention means a corresponding increase in the consumption of executive 
control resources, which, given the limited supply of these resources, suggests they must detract 
from other executive functions. This impairs the performance of tasks involving inhibition, 
reasoning, or planning. Cognitive depletion, then, might explain why addicts regularly fail to 
override their type-1 processes in cases in which they experience a conflict between type-1 and 
type-2 processes (see also Levy 2013). In combination, attentional bias and cognitive depletion 
increase cognitive inflexibility, that is, they reduce addicts’ capacity to switch their thinking 
and attention among different tasks, operations or practical perspectives in response to changing 
goals or circumstances. Their drug-related decision-making becomes, as a result, more 
stimulus-bound and less responsive to reasons to abstain from drugs. Since cognitive flexibility 
is plausibly part of a well-functioning will, drug-associated attentional bias can thus be said to 
disrupt addicts’ will by drastically reducing cognitive flexibility and, in this sense, causing their 
will to malfunction. 
 
4 Addiction between Illness and Choice 
This account no doubt needs more development and defence than I can provide here, but 
assuming that it is on the right tracks, what are the implications for the supposed opposition 
between medical models and choice models in addiction science, and for the disagreement 
between those who claim addicts have lost free will and those who claim they suffer from 
weakness of will? 
First, a malfunctioning of the will of the sort proposed neither implies that addicts’ will 
must be unfree nor that it must be weak. Although cognitive inflexibility makes it much harder 
for addicts to revise or abandon their drug-oriented decision-making pattern, there is no reason 
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to assume it makes them unable, in general, to resist their desires for drugs. Unlike a loss of 
capacities of resistance (and hence free will), cognitive inflexibility might be offset, for 
example, by a sharp increase of intentional effort, i.e. by forcefully and actively redirecting 
attention towards drug-unrelated aspects of the situation, or to the normative reasons. Further, 
it seems hardly plausible that such malfunctioning constitutes ordinary weakness of will. By 
drastically reducing cognitive flexibility, drug-related attentional bias creates persistent 
obstacles to addicts’ decision-making – obstacles requiring a sustained and extraordinary effort 
to overcome. Even addicts who exhibit a strong will to give up drugs frequently fail due to the 
difficulties of maintaining abstinence. Insofar as they do not seem criticizable for weakness of 
the will, it seems unfair to blame them for their lack of success. 
Second, regarding the supposed opposition between medical models and choice models, 
a malfunctioning of the will of the sort proposed here neither rules out intention and choice in 
addictive behavior nor compulsion in the clinical sense. That addictive behavior patterns are 
sustained by cognitive inflexibility does not mean that addicts cannot choose to perform drug-
oriented actions on the basis of their beliefs and desires. What causes their lack of control is the 
shaping of these beliefs and desires by processes that are completely dissociated from their 
propositional attitude system. Even in cases in which they perform drug-oriented actions 
contrary to what they desire, believe, or even judge is best, their actions can still be guided by 
intentions and they can retain the capacity to refrain from performing them. There is no reason, 
therefore, to assume that addicts do not intentionally engage in addictive behavior. 
Finally, drug-associated attentional bias is underpinned by type-1 processes it is easy to 
imagine could create behavior patterns that exhibit features of compulsivity. The “compulsion” 
often reported by addicts might simply be the subjective experience of cue-triggered decision-
making, that is, decision-making underpinned by associative relations in memory activated 
without their conscious intention, deliberation, or even awareness. If this is correct, what 
distinguishes compulsive from non-compulsive actions would not simply be the causal strength 
of their motivational antecedents (as is standardly assumed) – strong desires, for example, are 
felt by most normal persons from time to time – but rather their frequency, computational speed, 
cue-dependence and dissociated nature, features that together disrupt the normal functioning of 
their will and therefore make it extremely hard to maintain resistance over time.   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that a dual-process approach can explain the seemingly paradoxical 
features of addictive behavior, that is, its appearance of control and of non-control. It shows 
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how addiction can involve intentional actions that are freely performed, why addicts can make 
choices, as well as why addictive behavior still counts as, in an important sense, “compulsive” 
and “out of control.” It therefore resolves the apparent conflict between medical and choice 
models of addiction. Addiction, on this view, is a varied and multi-determined behavioral 
phenomenon. Many different factors – ranging from social and psychological factors shaping 
reasons and choice to biological changes disrupting the capacity for attentional control – are 
likely to affect its manifestations in individual cases, the difficulties facing the addict wanting 
to quit, and what are the best ways of helping her achieve that goal. But if the argument of this 
chapter is correct, then every addict can be said to suffer from a malfunctioning of the will 
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